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Macroeconomic policy thinking in India has been rooted in an environment with
ﬁve key parameters: agricultural shocks rather than a conventional business cycle,
a closed economy, deeply distortionary tax policy coupled with a ﬁscal crisis, ﬁnan-
cial markets that lacked speculative price discovery, and a monetary policy shaped
by deﬁcit ﬁnancing. This environment has been completely altered through India’s
integration into the world economy, the rise of one ﬁnancial market (the equity mar-
ket), the reduced importance of the monsoon, the rise of conventional business cycle
dynamics, a partial abatement of the ﬁscal crisis and a monetary policy environment
with loss of autonomy owing to exchange rate pegging. These changes call for a
rethink of the macroeconomic policy framework. The agenda of assuring ﬁscal sta-
bility needs to be seen to its conclusion. Monetary policy and ﬁscal policy need to
be converted into tools for macroeconomic stabilisation.
∗This is a preliminary version of the article New issues in Indian macro policy, which appeared in
Business Standard India, edited by T. N. Ninan, Business Standard Books, 2008. I am grateful to Vijay
Kelkar, M. Govinda Rao, Amaresh Bagchi, Ila Patnaik, Raghuram Rajan, Eswar Prasad, Percy Mistry,
Ashok Desai and Joydeep Mukherji for valuable discussions.
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21 The old world
For many decades, macro-policy in India was conducted in an environment with ﬁve key
elements:
￿ Agricultural shocks rather than a conventional business cycle In the old India, there was no
‘business cycle’ in the conventional sense of the term. GDP growth was repeatedly thrown
oﬀ trend by monsoon shocks. In a sheltered environment where competition from imports
and from new entrants was blocked by the government, the behaviour of ﬁrms was not
dominated by a forward-looking quest for proﬁtable investment opportunities. The cyclical
behaviour of proﬁts, inventories, investment and prices, which is the essence of the ‘business
cycle’ that is found in market economies, did not exist.
￿ A closed economy The old India was a closed economy with steep barriers against trade
in goods, services and capital ﬂows. As a consequence, the useful mental models of the
macroeconomy were those that were rooted in a closed economy.
￿ Deeply distortionary tax policy coupled with a ﬁscal crisis The central gross ﬁscal deﬁcit
escalated from 3.3% in 1970-71 to 8.3% in 1986-87. The ﬁrst task of macroeconomic policy
was that of wrestling down the ﬁscal deﬁcit, and averting a ﬁscal crisis. This process was
complicated by the need to simultaneously shift away from a distortionary framework of
tax policy towards eﬃcient tax policy. This involved sometimes worsening the ﬁscal deﬁcit
in the quest for eﬃciency - as was the case with the phasing out of customs duties.1
￿ Financial markets that lacked speculative price discovery Financial markets were prohibited,
or dominated by government owned ﬁnancial ﬁrms, or were vitiated by rules imposed by the
government. Hence, key markets were aﬄicted with illiquidity and lacked forward-looking
speculative price discovery. The role played by ﬁnance in a mature market economy -
of converting expectations about the future into information used for decision-making by
economic agents, and of driving the allocation of capital - was not being performed.
￿ A monetary policy which was shaped by deﬁcit ﬁnancing Fiscal deﬁcits were partly funded
through ﬁnancial repression: by forcing ﬁnancial ﬁrms to buy government bonds at below-
market interest rates. In addition, deﬁcit ﬁnancing was done on a substantial scale. Mone-
tary policy was, then, conducted in a closed-economy setting, with artiﬁcial interest rates,
and a substantial scale of monetisation of deﬁcits.
In this article, we argue that India has changed beyond recognition on all these ﬁve
elements. We argue that these changes have far-reaching consequences for the conduct
of macroeconomic policy. The tried and true policy reﬂexes which worked well in the
1980s and 1990s are increasingly out of touch with the new realities. India is now a
more conventional market economy, and there is a much bigger role for the great themes
of macroeconomics - as it is practised elsewhere in the world - in shaping Indian macro
policy.
1As an example of the tensions of undertaking a ﬁscal consolidation while simultaneously removing
distortions, see Rajaraman (2004).
3Table 1 Gross ﬂows (current and capital accounts)
(Billion USD) (Percent to GDP)
Current Capital Total
1957 4.4 0.7 5.2
1967 6.2 3.5 9.6
1977 15.4 5.0 20.4
1987 38.3 14.6 53.0
1997 115.8 61.4 177.3








2 What has changed
Compared with these initial conditions, a sea change has taken place in the post-1991
period.
2.1 Globalisation
From an economic perspective, globalisation involves integration into the world economy
for trade in goods and services, and capital ﬂows. The familiar trade/GDP ratio measures
the trade-intensity of a country by summing across merchandise imports and exports,
and expressing these relative to GDP. In similar fashion, an eﬀective way of measuring
globalisation is to sum up the ﬂows coming into and out of the country on the current
account and the capital account. This is shown in Table 1 in units of billion USD and
percent to GDP.
Measured in USD, we see substantial growth, going from $5 billion in 1956-57 to $909
billion in 2006-07. The most important features are, however, revealed when viewed as
percent to GDP. Total ﬂows stagnated at roughly 20% of GDP between 1956-57 and 1986-
87. The reforms of the early 1990s led to a much bigger value of 49.9% in 1996-97. From
there, the recent years have seen a dramatic expansion to 110% of GDP in 2006-07. This
suggests a rapid and unprecedented globalisation of the Indian economy (Kelkar, 2004b).
Continued progress is likely in removing tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers, building infras-
tructure for transportation and communications, and removing capital controls.2 Hence,
gross ﬂows across the boundary are likely to continue to grow faster than GDP.
Of particular importance is the size of the current account, which has grown from
17.3% of GDP in 1986-87 to 60.6% of GDP in 2006-07. Economic agents are able to use
misinvoicing to transfer substantial resources across a large current account (Mishra et al.,
2007; Patnaik and Vasudevan, 2000). Hence openness on the current account inevitably
goes along with substantial de facto openness on the capital account. In particular, with
2See Nothing calibrated about CAC in Business Standard, at http://www.mayin.org/ajayshah/MEDIA/
2007/worry_cac.html on the web, for a discussion of the lags between changes in the institutional envi-
ronment, and their translation into substantial cross-border ﬂows on the current account and the capital
account.
4the rise of outbound FDI, many Indian ﬁrms have turned themselves into multinational
corporations. They are now able to do transfer pricing with their oﬀshore subsidiaries, and
thus achieve capital ﬂows. If misinvoicing of 10% takes place on average on all current
account transactions, then this could be used to move 6% of GDP across the boundary.
This constitutes an enormous movement of capital.
Putting together the channels of misinvoicing, FII ﬂows, inbound and outbound FDI,
debt ﬂows, structured ﬁnancial transactions, etc, substantial capital ﬂows are now feasible.
While a debate continues to take place on whether and when India should usher in capital
account convertibility, the facts on the ground are that there is already substantial de facto
convertibility.
The capital controls that remain are yielding various kinds of microeconomic distortions
and rent-seeking. The removal of capital controls is important from the viewpoint of
eliminating frictions, improving competition in ﬁnance, and in reducing risk through global
diversiﬁcation (Mistry, 2007). However, in thinking about macroeconomics, India is closer
to full convertibility than is generally perceived. The useful mental models are those drawn
from open economy macroeconomics.
2.2 Government control of ﬁnance has partially eased
In the old India, key ﬁnancial markets were banned, or were vitiated by the government.
In recent decades, one element of ﬁnance has largely broken free of government control –
the equity market. The equity market has achieved a full ecosystem with high levels of
liquidity and market eﬃciency (Thomas, 2006). It has:
￿ Private equity investors;
￿ The IPO market;
￿ A fairly liquid secondary market, with electronic trading, competing exchanges, nationwide
anonymous electronic trading, risk management at the clearing corporation;
￿ Derivatives trading comprising onshore exchange-traded derivatives and oﬀshore OTC deriva-
tives;
￿ Mutual funds;
￿ Stock market indexes, index funds and index derivatives;
￿ Barring barriers faced by pension funds, few domestic participants are blocked from market
access;
￿ Convertibility for ‘foreign institutional investors’.
While the government is involved in regulation and supervision of the equity market,
it has no role in determining prices of equity securities. This is in contrast with the three
other elements of ﬁnance – currencies, commodities and bonds – where speculative price
discovery does not take place in India, and government is integral to determining prices.
5Table 2 Banks and markets in the Indian economy
(Trillion rupees)
Non food credit COSPI market capitalisation
June 1990 1.0009 0.4865
September 2007 19.8839 51.9647
Change (times) 19.8660 106.8134
This transformation of the equity market may have helped reshape the ﬁnancing of
ﬁrms, with a move towards much more equity ﬁnancing. Table 2 shows an imperfect
comparison about India’s evolution away from a bank-dominated ﬁnancial system. In the
case of banks, we show the stock of outstanding ‘non-food credit’. In the case of the
equity market, we show the stock of market capitalisation of the CMIE COSPI index.3
The strength of this comparison lies in the fact that both values are accurately measured.
However, it is an imperfect comparison in that it compares the market value of equity of
just 2,763 most liquid ﬁrms against all credit given out by the banking system.
This evidence shows that over the recent 17.26 years, non-food credit grew by 19.87
times. Over that same period, the COSPI market capitalisation grew by 106.8 times.4 The
COSPI market capitalisation was roughly half of non-food credit in 1990; by 2007 it was
2.6 times the size of non-food credit. In March 1991, the COSPI market capitalisation was
12.9% of GDP; by March 2007 it had risen to 94.4% of GDP.
From the viewpoint of macroeconomics, these developments imply a signiﬁcant change
in behaviour of the economy. The rise of the equity market implies that there is a new
role for a forward-looking market in the investment behaviour of ﬁrms. Expectations of
equity market participants shape investment. This is in contrast with earlier decades,
where ﬁnancial ﬂows were substantially driven by government decisions.
2.3 The business cycle
In mainstream macroeconomics, the inventory and investment of ﬁrms lie at the core of
‘business cycle’ ﬂuctuations. In boom times, proﬁt rates are high, the investment/GDP
ratio surges and inventories are drawn down. In recessions, proﬁt rates drop, invest-
ment/GDP drops, and inventories build up. These developments play out over multi-year
time periods. We call this textbook characterisation the ‘conventional business cycle’.5
3The CMIE Cospi index contains all ﬁrms where trading took place on atleast 66% of the days in the
last six months. In June 1990, there were 971 ﬁrms in the index; by September 2007 this had risen to
2,763 ﬁrms.
4Over this period, the COSPI P/E rose from 16.57 to 27.61, a rise of 1.66 times. Hence, the bulk of
the rise in the COSPI market capitalisation was based on the growth of the ﬁrms and the growth of the
number of ﬁrms.
5Strictly speaking, all India has is a ‘growth cycle’, since negative GDP growth rates almost never
materialise.
6Figure 1 Agriculture/GDP ratio






























2.3.1 Monsoon shocks matter less
In the India of old, there was no conventional business cycle (Patnaik and Sharma, 2002).
A good year was one with a good monsoon and a downturn was generally about a bad
monsoon. These developments played out over a short horizon of one or two years. Output
ﬂuctuations signiﬁcantly reﬂected a succession of uncorrelated monsoon shocks - it was not
a conventional business cycle.
A major change in the behaviour of the Indian macroeconomy, then, consists of the
rapidly dropping importance of agriculture. As Figure 1 shows, the share of agriculture in
GDP has dropped quite sharply from 27% in 1996-97 to 17.5% in 2006-07.
In addition, the vulnerability of agriculture to the monsoon is declining through the
spread of irrigation. The linkages between agriculture and the economy are weaken-
ing. Putting these factors together, the domination of monsoon shocks in inﬂuencing
the macroeconomy has been substantially attenuated.
Linearly extrapolating into the future, agriculture may drop below 10% of GDP by
2013, by which time it would be an essentially insigniﬁcant part of Indian macroeconomics.
Agriculture will stop mattering for macroeconomics; within a few years, it will be just
another industry.
2.3.2 A more conventional business cycle
In recent years, large ﬂuctuations of inventory and investment of ﬁrms have taken place, in
line with the mainstream notions of a conventional business cycle that is found in mature
market economies.
Several factors are at work here. In the old world, ﬁrms did not have operational ﬂex-
ibility to invest. Firms were static, with ﬁxed technology and minute product variation
7over time. The product life-cycle was very long, which necessitated reduced investment.
Low competition gave high proﬁtability and thus signiﬁcant internal resources; the pres-
sures of facing ﬁnancial markets that is caused by external ﬁnancing requirements were
subdued. Most projects were proﬁtable, and the bottleneck lay in getting support from the
government in terms of licensing. Since most projects were proﬁtable, high leverage was
advantageous, and ﬁrms also competed in the political process of accessing debt ﬁnance in
an environment where government controlled banking. Finally, in the old world, a substan-
tial scale of investment took place in the public sector, where bureacratic processes rather
than forward-looking decision making controlled the ﬂow of investment. This enhanced
the stability in investment.
There has been a sea change in the environment of ﬁrms. Investment by the public sector
based on ﬁve year plans has subsided. Entry barriers have been largely eliminated, so ﬁrms
now engage in forward looking decisions about investment. With low trade barriers and
foreign ﬁrms operating in India, Indian ﬁrms are now operating in the much more dynamic
global market. Investment decisions are now qualitatively diﬀerent from the past. The
environment is now one of short product cycles, technological complexity, and investment
opportunities all over the world. With high competition, many projects are unproﬁtable.
Proﬁts are uncertain, and expectations about proﬁt drive investment decisions, as is the
case with ﬁrms in all mature market economies. With greater uncertainty, there is a greater
requirement for equity capital. Firms have access to a strong equity market, which (in turn)
is discriminating in the industries and management teams which get attractive valuations.
In this environment, the investment by ﬁrms is highly variable, reﬂecting changing
conditions in domestic, global and ﬁnancial markets. This is a sea change when compared
with the stability of investment in previous decades.
Finally, the sheer size of the large ﬁrms has grown signiﬁcantly when compared with
GDP, to a point where ﬂuctuations in the investment and inventory of ﬁrms are important
on a GDP scale.
Figure 2 shows the time-series of private corporate gross capital formation (GCF),
expressed as percent to GDP. In preceding decades, this number was small – below 6% of
GDP. The decline from a good year to a bad year was perhaps two percentage points of
GDP, and this was hence relatively un-important on the scale of macroeconomics.
In recent years, we have seen the emergence of the behaviour found in the conventional
business cycle. In the investment boom of the mid-1990s, private corporate GCF rose from
5% of GDP in 1990-91 to 11.4% of GDP in 1995-96. This then fell dramatically in the
business cycle downturn to 5.9% in 2001-02, and has since recovered to 14.1% in 2005-06.
These ﬂuctuations – a rise or fall of six to eight percentage points of GDP – are now large
when compared to GDP; they now inﬂuence macroeconomics. The inventory/investment
cycle of private corporations is, hence, of central interest in understanding the new ‘con-
ventional business cycle’ dynamics of India.
Figure 3 shows the quarterly time-series of the net proﬁt margin of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms,
as seen in the CMIE database. This series only starts from Jun 1998, when quarterly
disclosures by ﬁrms began. It shows features associated with the ‘business cycle’ as it is
known in mainstream economics. It exhibits regularities at business cycle frequencies –
8Figure 2 Private corporate gross capital formation (percent to GDP)
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9as opposed to the short-lived shocks associated with monsoons. It shows a recovery of
proﬁts through 2002-03, one of the worst monsoons in recent experience - an example of
the diminishing importance of agriculture. It shows a large diﬀerence between proﬁtability
in the downturn – below 2% over 2000-2002 – and that seen in an upturn – roughly 8%
after 2006. These movements appear to coincide remarkably well with the global business
cycle.
2.4 Exchange rate inﬂexibility
There is a widespread belief in India that in the early 1990s, the rupee became a ‘market
determined exchange rate’. However, currency ﬂexibility actually went down in the early
1990s. INR/USD volatility was 8.35% per year from early-1973 till end-1991. This dropped
to 4.3% in the period from early-1994 till September 2007.6
With this near-halving of currency ﬂexibility, India embarked on a monetary policy
framework of a pegged exchange rate with a de facto opening capital account in the 1990s
(Patnaik, 2007). A key insight of modern open economy macroeconomics is the ‘impossible
trinity’: when a country pursues currency policy while having an open capital account, the
lever of monetary policy gets ‘used up’ in achieving the currency target. In India, the
pegged exchange rate coupled with growing openness on the capital account has induced
a growing loss of monetary policy autonomy. The lever of monetary policy is repeatedly
‘used up’ for achieving currency targets. Monetary policy is not able to stabilise the local
economy.
While these diﬃculties have been brewing since the late 1990s, they have become starkly
visible in recent years (Patnaik, 2003, 2005; Joshi, 2003). When capital has come into
India, the attempt by RBI to peg the exchange rate has led to a surge in reserve money.
Exchange rate pegging has hijacked monetary policy. The impossible trinity, which was
once dismissed as ‘just a theory’, is on the front pages of Indian newspapers.
2.5 The ﬁscal crisis has partially abated
The central gross ﬁscal deﬁcit escalated dramatically from 3.17% in 1974-75 to a peak of
8.3% in 1986-87. While the reforms of the early 1990s dented the deﬁcit, it resurged to 7% in
1998-99. Through the late 1980s and the 1990s, ﬁscal stability was the most important issue
in macroeconomic policy. This led to an enormous eﬀort in transforming ﬁscal policy, which
included improvements in tax policy, improvements in tax administration, the enactment
of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budgetary Management (FRBM) Act, and the Twelfth
Finance Commission (Rao, 2005; Kelkar, 2004a).
As Figure 4 shows, in recent years, there has been a considerable change in the ﬁscal
outlook.
6High INR/USD volatility in the pre-1991 period was not caused by pegging to the GBP. INR/GBP
volatility was higher - at 10.2% - than INR/USD volatility in the 1973-1991 period.
10Figure 4 Fiscal consolidation of the central government










































































































11￿ Central gross ﬁscal deﬁcit The top left graph shows the central gross ﬁscal deﬁcit expressed
as percent of GDP. A ﬁscal consolidation of three percentage points has come about: from
7% in 1998-99 to 4% in 2006-07. This corresponds to an average improvement of 0.37
percentage points a year over eight years. It now appears likely that the FRBM target of
a central gross ﬁscal deﬁcit of 3% in 2008-09 will be achieved, though achieving the target
of a revenue deﬁcit of zero appears daunting.
￿ Extent of pre-emption of resources The right hand top graph expresses the central gross
ﬁscal deﬁcit as percent of non-government saving. This peaked at near 50% in the late 1980s
and has dropped to unprecedentedly low levels, reﬂecting a combination of a reduction in
the gross ﬁscal deﬁcit and an expansion of savings of the private sector.
￿ Debt/GDP ratio The left hand bottom graph shows total central government liabilities as
percent of GDP. There was a worrisome period from 1996-97 to 2002-03 where this ratio
rose from 53.6% to 69%. However, in the following years, it has dropped slightly to 67.75%
in 2006-07. The right hand bottom graph shows the ratio of internal debt to GDP. This
is particularly relevant given that the central government’s oﬀshore borrowing is generally
at concessional terms and does not directly fund domestic deﬁcits. This shows a somewhat
more pronounced ﬁscal consolidation.
Turning to the consolidated deﬁcit of the centre and states, from a peak value of 9.63%
of GDP in 2001-02, this had dropped to 6.36% of GDP in 2006-07: a gain of 3.27 percentage
points in ﬁve years or an average pace of improvement of 0.65 percent of GDP per year.
The gross ﬁscal deﬁcit of the states alone dropped from an average of 4.3% in 2000-2004
to 2.1% in 2007-08 (budgeted) (Kishore and Prasad, 2007).
These changes constitute a transformation of Indian public ﬁnance and hence the
macroeconomic environment.
12Table 3 Changes in Indian macroeconomics
The old Indian macroeconomy The new Indian macroeconomy
A sequence of agricultural shocks
rather than a conventional busi-
ness cycle.
A sharp drop in the importance
of agriculture in the economy,
and the commencement of a con-
ventional business cycle based
on the inventory/investment be-
haviour of ﬁrms that operate in a
transformed environment.
A closed economy. A rapid movement towards an
open economy, with the removal
of trade barriers and onset of de
facto convertibility.
Deeply distortionary tax policy
coupled with a ﬁscal crisis.
Signiﬁcant progress in easing dis-
tortions caused by tax policy, and
in easing the ﬁscal crisis.
A monetary policy which was hi-
jacked by deﬁcit ﬁnancing.
A new regime of exchange rate in-
ﬂexibility, which has given a con-
siderable loss of monetary policy
autonomy when juxtaposed with
increased de facto convertibility.
Primitive ﬁnancial markets with
illiquidity, government control,
and the lack of speculative price
discovery.
The rise of one genuine ﬁnan-
cial market – the equity market –
which is large by the standards of
macroeconomics, where there is
genuine liquidity and there is no
government control over prices.
3 Looking forward
This article has argued that the old world of Indian macroeconomics as been transformed
in the post-1991 period, as summarised in Table 3. The period from 1991 to 2007 covers
16 years. Diﬀerent elements of this ‘sea change’ have fallen into place at diﬀerent times.
However, the main point of this article is that put together, these changes constitute a
fundamental transformation of the environment of macroeconomic policy.
In this radically transformed environment, what should macroeconomic policy seek to
do? Two tasks rise above others. The half-ﬁnished task of confronting the ﬁscal crisis
needs to be completed satisfactorily. This needs to be accompanied by a new focus on
stabilisation of the business cycle as the core task of macroeconomic policy. This involves
fresh thinking on both ﬁscal and monetary policy.
133.1 Fiscal stability
Putting the Indian State on a sound footing in terms of public ﬁnance requires three
attributes:
1. Correct measurement of deﬁcits and debt;
2. A declining debt/GDP ratio in all years, except for a rare calamity;7
3. Voluntary purchase of government bonds by well motivated actors.
As an example of sound public ﬁnance, Figure 5 shows the 300 year history of the
debt/GNP ratio in the UK.8 From the late 18th century onwards, the debt/GNP ratio
generally declined in normal years, with increases being mostly linked to war expenses.
Figure 4 has shown a considerable improvement in ﬁscal outcomes in India in recent
years. However, a careful evaluation of the sources of improvement in recent years, and
looking forward at possible scenarios, suggests that the task of placing the Indian State on
a sound footing in terms of public ﬁnance is only half complete. While remarkable progress
has come about, ﬁve key areas of concern remain:
￿ Accounting for oﬀ-balance-sheet liabilities Public debt should be reckoned inclusive
of the oﬀ-balance sheet liabilities such as those present owing to oil, fertiliser and the
Food Corporation of India.9 In addition, there are the unfunded promises of paying
pension to civil servants that have been estimated at over 65% of GDP (Bhardwaj
and Dave, 2006).10 Implicit guarantees that have been given to public sector ﬁnan-
cial ﬁrms are also highly valuable (Shah and Thomas, 2000). It is not possible to
evaluate whether the Debt/GDP ratio is dropping every year, and to discuss ﬁscal
stability associated with a given level of the deﬁcit, if these numbers are not measured
correctly.
The FRBM Act has perhaps given government an incentive to push more debt into
such oﬀ-balance items. In 2006-07, this oﬀ balance sheet borrowing on account of
oil companies and the Food Corporation of India amounted to Rs.35,350 crore or
7In the development economics literature, there is an argument that there is a case for running large
ﬁscal deﬁcits in a developing country in order to build physical infrastructure, which would then generate
GDP growth which would then drive down the debt/GDP ratio with a lag. In India, the bulk of the
investment in areas such as roads, ports, telecom, electricity generation, etc. is increasingly structured as
public private partnerships, where private infrastructure vendors put together ﬁnancing from the public
securities markets. The quantum of on-budget infrastructure expenditure is small, and its eﬀectiveness is
limited.
8This is drawn from Janssen et al. (1999).
9An editorial in Business Standard on 19 October reports that in 2007-08, ‘oil bonds’ of Rs.23,458 crore
would be issued, and public sector oil companies would ‘absorb’ a loss of Rs.54,935 crore, owing to the
involvement of government in the market for petroleum products.
10The New Pension System involves converting the unfunded pension debt for most civil servants re-
cruited from roughly January 2004 onwards into a stream of explicit on-budget payments (Shah, 2006).
14Figure 5 Debt/GNP ratio: the UK experience over 300 years
15Table 4 Sources of ﬁscal progress
(Percent to GDP)
1998-99 2006-07 Change
Central gross tax revenue 8.9 12.5 3.6
Income tax 1.25 2.2 0.95
Corporation tax 1.52 3.91 2.4
Customs 2.52 2.19 -0.33
Excise 3.29 3.13 -0.16
Central gross ﬁscal deﬁcit 7.01 4.07 -2.94
roughly one percent of GDP. Roughly speaking, these issues imply that the ﬁscal
deﬁcit in 2006-07 was understated by roughly one percent.
An urgent eﬀort needs to be undertaken to convert all liabilities into transparent,
on-budget liabilities, and to eliminate all oﬀ-budget ﬁnancing.
￿ The sixth pay commission A key question which will aﬀect the evolution of public
ﬁnance in the coming ﬁve years is the decisions on wages of civil servants made by
government in response to proposals from the sixth pay commission.
The present structure of wages for government employees involves paying too little at
senior levels and too much at lower levels (Glinskaya and Lokshin, 2005). Matching
wages to market benchmarks requires cutting wages for junior staﬀ, which can free
up resources. Even if this is politically infeasible, it is possible to bring about a
substantial increase in wages for senior staﬀ without a substantial ﬁscal burden,
because the number of employees at a senior level is very small.
Hence, it is feasible to achieve substantial beneﬁcial reforms of civil service wages
without aﬀecting the ﬁscal deﬁcit. However, political compulsions could well lead to
an outcome more like that of the ﬁfth pay commission of 1997, where GDP at factor
cost from public administration and defence expressed in constant prices rose by an
unprecedented 14.48%, 10.62% and 13.28% from 1997-98 to 1999-00.11
￿ Impact of a business cycle downturn on tax collections Table 4 suggests that the
essence of the partial abatement of the ﬁscal crisis lies in the 3.6 percentage point
increase in the Centre’s gross tax revenue from 1998-99 to 2006-07. This gain is
primarily about a 0.95 percentage point gain with income tax and a 2.4 percentage
point gain with corporation tax.
In the budget estimates for 2007-08, corporation tax was the biggest single source
of tax revenue, accounting for Rs.1.68 trillion out of gross tax revenues of Rs.5.48
11Some of the most harmful eﬀects of the ﬁfth pay commission were concentrated on the states. Between
1997-98 and 1999-2000, the primary deﬁcit of the states went up from 1 per cent to 2.6 per cent of SDP
and the ﬁscal deﬁcit from 3.2 per cent to 5.1 per cent. As a proportion of their revenue receipts, their
revenue deﬁcit went up from 9.6 per cent to 26 per cent.


























trillion. With roughly 31% of gross tax revenues coming from this source, volatility in
corporation tax revenues is now an important inﬂuence on the overall ﬁscal situation.
Figure 6 shows the net proﬁt growth, on a year-on-year basis, of all non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
observed in the CMIE database. These ﬁrms account for the bulk of corporation
tax payments to the government. This graph shows that we have experienced a
remarkable 21-quarter period of high and sustained net proﬁt growth. However, net
proﬁt growth of corporations even turns negative in a business cycle downturn – as
seen in September 1998 to September 1999, and from March 2001 to March 2002.
Thus, in a future business cycle downturn, corporation tax growth will not be buoy-
ant, and the nominal tax collections in a particular year could even decline when
compared with the previous year. In a future business cycle downturn, income tax
is also likely to suﬀer poor growth. The two key elements which have powered the
improvement in the ﬁscal situation are, hence, elements which have a fairly high
exposure to business cycle conditions. With the high reliance on income tax, the
volatility of tax revenues is now higher than it used to be.
￿ Expenditures on welfare programs Table 4 shows that central gross tax revenue im-
proved by 3.6 percentage points from 1998-99 to 2006-07. Roughly speaking, 30%
of central gross tax revenue is sent to the states, so the additional resources to the
centre were roughly 2.5 percent of GDP. Expenditure compression yielded another
0.4 percent of GDP, adding up to a reduction in the central gross ﬁscal deﬁcit of 2.9
percent of GDP. The bulk of the contribution to ﬁscal consolidation has, thus, come
from improved tax collections (2.5 percent of GDP) rather than from expenditure
reductions (0.4 percent of GDP). This is in contrast with the international experi-
ence with successful ﬁscal consolidations, where a drop in current expenditure plays
17a major role.
The UPA has now embarked on an ambitious array of welfare programs. The early
evidence suggests that these have not led to a sharp rise in the expenditure/GDP
ratio. However, in coming years, this could shape up diﬀerently. Some of these pro-
grams could build up a signiﬁcant administrative capability. Pressures for enlarging
budgetary allocations on a given program could emerge when an array of contrac-
tors and political parties learn how to tap into the spending opportunities presented
by the program. Finally, the expenditures of some of these programs, such as the
NREG, could go up in a business cycle downturn. Hence, these programs represent
a source of ﬁscal risk that is larger than is presently visible.
￿ Rethinking ﬁscal rules Roughly speaking, India now has ﬁscal rules which cap the
central ﬁscal deﬁcit at 3% of GDP and the ﬁscal deﬁcit of the states at another 3%
of GDP. A consolidated ﬁscal deﬁcit of 6% of GDP would be one of the biggest ﬁscal
deﬁcits in the world. There are many combinations of GDP growth rates and interest
rates for which this would yield an increasing debt/GDP ratio. In particular, interest
rates in the future are likely to be higher in the future when compared with those
present today, if monetary policy reforms take place.12
Hence, the legislative framework for ﬁscal responsibility needs to be amended so as
to shift towards greater ﬁscal prudence.
In summary, while India has made remarkable progress on the ﬁscal problem, the next
few years are a critical time in achieving a sound outcome, in addressing the ﬁve areas of
concern articulated above. These factors suggest that the ﬁrst task of macro policy in India
remains that of battling the ﬁscal crisis. The destination involves three key litmus tests:
Sound measurement of deﬁcits and debts, a declining debt/GDP ratio in all years except
for rare calamities, and purely voluntary purchase of government bonds by well motivated
actors. While India’s ﬁscal situation has progressed dramatically, with important legislative
and institutional changes, India is not yet at a point where these three tests are satisﬁed,
or will be satisﬁed with a high probability in the forseeable future.
3.2 Stabilisation
In past decades, India did not have a ‘conventional business cycle’ in the mainstream sense
of the term. All that was found was a sequence of short-lived agricultural shocks. Now,
the emergence of a large corporate sector, coupled with ﬂexibility of decision making in
the hands of this corporate sector, has - for the ﬁrst time - given a business cycle rooted
12With a pegged exchange rate, a period of capital inﬂow is associated with loose monetary policy and
accelerating inﬂation. This is an eﬀective characterisation of India’s monetary policy from 2002 onwards.
If monetary policy reform comes about, giving a cessation of exchange rate pegging, then monetary policy
would be concerned about issues such as inﬂation and the domestic business cycle. In this case, interest
rates on a business cycle upturn would be higher than those seen in 2007.
18in ﬂuctuations of inventory and investment. An interesting feature of this business cycle
lies in the increasing synchronisation with the world business cycle.
As a consequence, for the ﬁrst time, macroeconomic policy in India now needs to identify
ways through which the policy framework can stabilise this conventional business cycle, as
is done in market economies around the world.
3.2.1 Monetary policy
Before the ways and means agreement was signed between the Ministry of Finance and
RBI, the lever of monetary policy was ‘used up’ for doing deﬁcit ﬁnancing. With the ways
and means agreement in place, and after a signiﬁcant ﬁscal consolidation has come about,
monetary policy could have occupied the centre stage in stabilisation.
However, in the eary 1990s, currency ﬂexibility went down sharply. This was accom-
panied by a rapid transition to de facto convertibility. As a consequence, the lever of
monetary policy was ‘used up’ for achieving currency targets. Thus, by the early 2000s,
just when India was experiencing a conventional business cycle, where monetary policy
could have come into its own in stabilising this business cycle, monetary policy autonomy
was lost through a combination of convertibility accompanied by exchange rate rigidity.
This combination of the existing ﬁscal policy framework and the existing monetary
policy framework leaves India without a macro policy framework for stabilisation. This
suggests that Indian GDP growth volatility will be high in coming years, higher than is
found in other continental-sized economies which have achieved a stabilising monetary
policy.
The ‘Taylor principle’ asserts that for monetary policy to be stabilising, the response
of the central bank to a shock in expected inﬂation has to be greater than one-for-one.13
The inﬂation coeﬃcient in estimated Taylor rules has to be greater than one. Present
estimates in India (Mohanty and Klau, 2004; Virmani, 2004) yield values well below 0.5.
This suggests that monetary policy in India violates the Taylor principle, that monetary
policy in India is destabilising. This is, of course, consistent with the picture of a monetary
policy regime that is driven by exchange rate pegging. In an open economy, a central bank
that runs a pegged exchange rate cannot control inﬂation or contribute to stabilising the
business cycle.
Reorienting monetary policy to the task of stabilisation requires changes in institutional
arrangements.
With an open capital account, exchange rate pegging clearly induces a loss of monetary
policy autonomy. However, a ﬂoating exchange rate is not a monetary regime. A mere
switch from a pegged exchange rate to a ﬂoating rate, without fully thinking through the
implications for monetary economics, would be a mistake. Countries that have lacked a
nominal anchor, such as Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico and Chile, are known to have
suﬀered prolonged episodes of high and variable inﬂation. With increasing INR/USD
volatility in recent months (Figure 7), India runs the risk of entering a period of high and
13See Was a rate hike required in Business Standard, at http://www.mayin.org/ajayshah/MEDIA/
2006/ratehike.html on the web.
































































2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
4.95
CPI vol = 1.40 percent/month
Feb: 5.47
20variable inﬂation (Figure 8). Anchoring ﬁat money to the basket of goods in the consumer
price index is now seen to be the right solution for achieving a nominal anchor, one that
stabilises the domestic economy.
Just as the FRBM constrained ﬁscal policy, new legislation is required, which con-
strains monetary policy to deliver an inﬂation target in an environment of transparency,
accountability and independence. This requires divesting all functions other than setting
the short-term interest rate from the central bank. Largely speaking, this is well understood
territory, where dozens of countries have implemented such reforms. An Indian eﬀort in
monetary policy reform would need to adapt this broad understanding to local conditions.
3.2.2 Fiscal policy
As emphasised above, placing Indian public ﬁnance on a sound footing involves passing
three tests: (a) Sound measurement of deﬁcits and debts, (b) A debt/GDP ratio that de-
clines in all years except for rare calamities and (c) Government bonds that are voluntarily
purchased by well motivated actors. The approach of the FRBM Act, has been to place a
limit of 0 upon the revenue deﬁcit and a limit of 3% of GDP for the ﬁscal deﬁcit. There
is a broad consensus in India that this was an appropriate strategy to bring about a ﬁscal
consolidation.
However, looking forward, a ﬁscal strategy where the government tries to rigidly hold
the revenue deﬁcit and the ﬁscal deﬁcit near these two values of 0% and 3% is neither
feasible nor optimal.
The ﬁrst issue is that of feasibility. In a business cycle downturn, tax revenues will
inevitably be hurt. This is particularly owing to the importance of corporation tax and
income tax, which are vulnerable to business cycle ﬂuctuations. Expenditures on programs
such as NREG will inevitably go up in a downturn. When a budget is crafted in February
2008, data about the economy is only known upto December 2007. Hence, little is known
about business cycle conditions that will prevail from April 2008 to March 2009. Hence,
‘ﬁscal marksmanship’ will inevitably be poor.
At the same time, an enlargement of the deﬁcit in a downturn constitutes a stabilising
response on the part of ﬁscal policy. From the viewpoint of stabilisation, it is healthy and
appropriate to have a higher ﬁscal deﬁcit in a downturn. Yet, the very credibility of ﬁscal
rules will be adversely aﬀected if, for sound reasons of a business cycle downturn, the limits
are frequently violated. Financial markets will not trust Indian public ﬁnance if claimed
ﬁscal rules are violated.
In addition, the present ﬁscal responsibility framework involves limits for the centre
and states which add up to capping the consolidated ﬁscal deﬁcit of centre and states at
6% of GDP. This is one of the biggest ﬁscal deﬁcits of the world. As Table 5 shows, in
the class of countries with a long-term foreign currency sovereign rating which was at the
lowest possible investment grade (S&P’s BBB), only Hungary had a ﬁscal deﬁcit of 6.8%.
It will be diﬃcult for India to maintain an investment grade rating while running such a
large deﬁcit; public ﬁnance will often be teetering on the edge of diﬃculty.
21Table 5 Consolidated ﬁscal surplus in countries with an S&P long-term foreign currency
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Both these aspects can be addressed by moving forward to a new FRBM-II formulation,
involving three key elements:
1. The limit for the consolidated deﬁcit of the centre and states needs to be pushed
downwards to a value near 3% instead of the existing 6%, so as to assure a declining
debt/GDP ratio at all times. Through this, India would rise up from the bottom
when international comparisons of deﬁcits are made.
2. Fiscal rules should require that budgets are formulated with a target of a consolidated
deﬁcit of 1% of GDP.
3. In the event that business cycle conditions prove to be diﬃcult, the ﬁscal rules should
permit a slippage going up to 3% of GDP. Through this, ﬁscal policy would be
stabilising, yielding a consolidated deﬁcit of near 1% when times are good but going
down to 3% in a recession.
Such a framework addresses numerous problems. It eliminates the possibility of an
increasing debt/GDP ratio that can arise with a consolidated deﬁcit of 6% of GDP. Fiscal
policy would be stabilising, because there is a provision through which a budgeted deﬁcit
of 1% (summing across centre and states) can enlarge to 3% owing to lower tax revenues
and higher expenditures. At the same time, this would be done in a way which preserves
the credibility of the ﬁscal rules.14
14For a proposal to explicitly put the debt/GDP ratio into the ﬁscal rule, see Mistry (2006).
22How might this further reduction of the ﬁscal deﬁcit come about? Looking back, the
consolidated deﬁcit dropped by 3.27 percentage points from 2001-02 to 2006-07, an im-
provement of 0.65 percent of GDP per year. How might we go forward, and obtain an
additional reduction in the consolidated deﬁcit of roughly ﬁve15 percentage points? Two
elements of a ﬁscal strategy are visible. The introduction of the Goods and Services Tax
(GST) can lead to an improvement of the tax-GDP ratio of roughly two percentage of GDP.
The deployment of information technology for the purpose of delivering cash subsidies to
poor people could support a large reorganisation of government expenditures, yielding a
reduction in expenditure of three percent of GDP. Put together, these two strategies oﬀer
the prospect of obtaining the required gain.
15Roughly speaking, what is required is going from a consolidated deﬁcit of 6.36% in 2006-07 to a value
like 1% of GDP under buoyant business cycle conditions.
234 Conclusion
The basic relationships in Indian macroeconomics have changed profoundly in recent years.
The main point of this article is to highlight the fundamental structural change that has
taken place at a qualitative level. These changes have the following implications:
￿ Caution when working with data When aiming to obtain insights into the present
structure of the economy, the enterprise of empirical macroeconomics needs to be
careful in specifying models which make logical sense under present conditions, and
estimation eﬀorts need to carefully test for structural breaks.
Indeed, given the short data series in the ‘new regime’, estimation of relationships
through formal econometrics may often be infeasible. In this case, there may still
be valuable insights obtained by thinking through the qualitative relationships that
prevail in this new world, based on the ideas of open economy macroeconomics.
￿ Skepticism about the traditional policy framework An intuitive understanding of the
dynamics and responses of Indian macroeconomics that is rooted in earlier experi-
ences must be treated with caution. The relationships have changed. The macro
policy framework which worked well in the 1980s and the 1990s can no longer be
applied in the present setting.
￿ A continued focus on ﬁscal stability This involves an elimination of oﬀ-balance sheet
deﬁcits, prudent handling of the proposals of the sixth pay commission, achieving
strong ﬁscal outcomes in the present business cycle upturn so as to be able to achieve
the FRBM targets in a downturn, and prudence in expenditure programs.
￿ New thinking on ﬁscal policy In order to complete the half-ﬁnished ﬁscal consolida-
tion, and to re-orient ﬁscal policy so that it can play a role in stabilisation of the
business cycle, an FRBM-II Act needs to be enacted, with the following key features:
1. Good quality measurement and disclosure of deﬁcits and debt;
2. Elimination of all oﬀ-budget ﬁnancing;
3. A limit on the consolidated ﬁscal deﬁcit of centre and states of roughly 3% of
GDP;
4. A mechanism for varying the ﬁscal deﬁcit based on business cycle condition.
Roughly speaking, this may require that the government budget for a consoli-
dated deﬁcit of 1% of GDP, a target which is achieved under strong business
cycle conditions, but worsens to no more than 3% of GDP under recessionary
conditions.
￿ New thinking on monetary policy While India has made important progress on re-
forms to public ﬁnance, monetary policy has not been comparably reconstructed. An
Indian Monetary Authority Act needs to be enacted, with the following key features:
241. Removal of functions from the central bank other than monetary policy.
2. A mandate for targeting inﬂation.
3. Mechanisms for independence of the interest-rate setting decision from electoral
politics.
4. Mechanisms for accountability, transparency and predictability.
India is not alone in steering macroeconomic policy away from an ill-posed set of in-
struments and goals. As an example, consider the UK, which is now widely seen as a role
model for well functioning policies on ﬁscal, monetary and ﬁnance through the reforms
of the late 1990s. Batini and Nelson (2005) emphasise that the UK spent many decades
ﬂoundering on macroeconomic thinking. As they say in their abstract:
Policymaking in recent decades has discarded various misconceptions about
the macroeconomy and the monetary transmission mechanism that oﬃcials held
in earlier periods. The misconceptions included: an underestimation of the
importance of monetary policy in demand management until 1970; a failure to
distinguish real and nominal interest rates until the late 1960s; the deployment
until the mid-1980s of ineﬀective monetary control devices that did not alter the
monetary base; and the adherence by policymakers in the 1960s and 1970s to
nonmonetary views of the inﬂation process. We also consider developments in
ﬁscal policy in light of changes in the doctrines underlying U.K. macroeconomic
decisions.
Many emerging markets have grappled with similar issues in recent years. In the decade
of the 1990s, an important source of policy evolution was the contradictions between in-
creasing de facto convertibility and pegged exchange rates. Inconsistent monetary pol-
icy regimes are known to destabilise capital ﬂows, and induce crisis phenomena such as
speculative attacks, sudden stops, etc. In many countries, these contradictions forced a
re-examination of the principles underlying macroeconomic policy.
India has not yet had a crisis deriving from the inconsistent monetary policy regime.
Monetary and ﬁscal reform is required to achieve a consistent ‘speculation-proof’ policy
framework, to smooth the process of India’s integration into the world economy. The ideal
scenario for the 2007-2010 period involves a reform eﬀort that puts a sound macroeconomic
policy framework into place before such a crisis comes about.
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